Carlo (MC) simulation is used to estimate the probability of sojourn in any of the previously defined degradation states, by accounting for both stochastic and deterministic processes that affect the degradation progression (e.g., the RTD drift phenomenon is dependent on the air gap size between the sensing element tip and the thermowell bottom, and on the RTD age that can be considered as stochastic and deterministic processes, respectively). The MC simulation relies on an integrated modeling of stochastic processes with deterministic aging of components that results to be fundamental for estimating the joint cumulative probability distribution of finding the component in any of the possible degradation states.
ABBREVIATIONS

Introduction
In support to the implementation of risk-informed decision-making approaches, Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) of modernizing Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) demands for detailed dynamic models of digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems that can adequately represent digital components failure modes and quantify their contribution to the overall risk of the NPPs (Aldemir et al., 2007; Aldemir et al., 2006) .
To this aim, dynamic methods are being increasingly integrated into existing PSA frameworks for digital I&C systems reliability assessment, such as: Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) (Guarro et al., 2012; Aldemir et al., 2006; Aldemir et al., 2009 ), Markov/cell-to-cell mapping technique (CCMT) Aldemir et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2014) , Petri Net (Lee et al., 2006; Kim and Kim, 2014) , Bayesian Networks (Boudali and Dugan, 2006; Broy et al., 2011) , Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) (Dehlinger and Dugan, 2008) , Dynamic Event Tree (DET) and Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) clustering method (Di Maio et al., 2011; Zio and Di Maio, 2009) . On a system level, these methods can be used to tackle the twofold purpose of PSA: on one side, the identification of the system failure domain and, on the other side, the quantification of the system failure probability.
With respect to the latter, given a failure threshold not to be exceeded by a safety-relevant physical variable during the system operation, a limit-state function G can be defined as:
where ̅ = { 1 , 2 , ⋯ , } defines the system parameters and operational conditions. This leads to the definition of a system safety domain = { ̅ : ( ̅ , ) < 0} and of a system failure domain = { ̅ : ( ̅ , ) > 0}, that are partitioned by a system failure boundary = ( ̅ , ) = 0, for a given .
The identification of the failure domain F is crucial especially when the system dynamics is complex and its component reliability assessment cannot be described by a Boolean, discrete and abrupt physics of failure, but rather by a multi-valued, and continuous degradation model as it is for digital I&C systems (Li et al., 2012; Lin et al., 2015; Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003) . The biggest challenge to be overcome for devising realistic and effective degradation models consists in the collection of component reliability data that are, often, affected by multiple and competing failure modes that are difficult to be untangled and reduced to a single-lumped failure criterion analysis that would leverage the degradation modeling task. To avoid simplification and overlooking of failure interdependencies, we propose to resort to a Multi-State Physics Modeling (MSPM) approach at the component level, which can be easily upscaled for system-level degradation modeling. The MSPM approach is based on the structure of Markov (or semi-Markov) modeling for the quantification of components reliability measures (Unwin et al., 2011; Unwin et al., 2012; Rocco and Zio, 2013; Fleming et al., 2010) . Recently, the MSPM approach has been proposed for modeling nuclear component degradation by accounting for both the effects of stochastic parameters affecting the degradation and the environmental parameters with their uncertainties (Lin et al., 2015; Di Maio et al., 2015) .
In this study, a component-level MSPM model for a digital I&C system is developed by integrating in the model both the stochastic and the deterministic processes that affect component degradation. The physical variable to be considered for the failure domain F identification is given in Eq. (2) (Kaiser and Gebraeel, 2009 ):
where t is the deterministic aging time, ̅ is a collection of physical parameters affecting the degradation process that can be seen as composed by ̅ = { 1 , ⋯ , } which is a vector of m-dimensional manufacturing features that affect the degradation (e.g., burn-in, contamination, etc.), ̅ = { 1 , ⋯ , } which is a vector of k-dimensional stochastic parameters that account for the components variability (e.g., nominal frequency stability, calibration error after maintenance, etc.), ̅ = { 1 , ⋯ , } which is a vector of l-dimensional external parameters that capture the variability of timevarying operating and environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, flux, etc.), and ( ) that is an error term that captures noise and disturbances. In principle, a component response surface to any possible different setting of degradation features (stochastic and external parameters, and error terms) can be built (with infinite computational resources)
such that the safety domain S can be partitioned from the failure domain F by setting a failure threshold .
In this work, a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation is used to estimate the transition probabilities among the degradation states of MSPM and drive, by random walks, the stochastic process of the evolution of the air gap size in time and the deterministic evolution of the component aging on the response surface for the identification of the limit surface of the drift event of a Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) that is embedded into a digital I&C system of a NPP.
Finally, as for traditional PSA (where system-level models are developed by combining or replacing subsystem or component models in the overall structure of a Fault Tree (FT) or an Event Tree (ET) (Aldemir et al., 2007; Aldemir et al., 2009; Gulati and Dugan, 1997) ), the system failure probability of the digital I&C system is quantified by upscaling the component-level MSPM into a system-level model that considers the inter-system or/and inter-component dependencies and the aleatory or/and epistemic uncertainties affecting each component behavior. 
The Component-Level MSPMs
In this study, the digital I&C System of reference, whose reliability assessment is required for the failure domain identification and the related risk quantification of a NPP, is a typical NPP Reactor Protection System (RPS). Its objective is to trigger reactor emergency shutdown as soon as an anomaly is detected in the measurements of some relevant signals (i.e., primary coolant pressure, temperature, etc.). As shown in (Wang et al., 2015) The system can be decomposed into modules to reduce the complexity of systemlevel modeling based on the functions the embedded components are devised for and the failure effects they produce on the system. According to the RPS scheme of Fig Herein, " 0 " and " " represent the "New" and "Failed" states of the i-th component in the system, whereas any other state " ", = 1,2, ⋯ , is an intermediate degradation state, where the component is partially functioning.
 State " 0 " is selected as the initial state at time t=0, i.e., the component is "New" at t=0. ... ... ... (Montalvo et al., 2014; Hashemian, 2011; Yun et al., 2012) , pressure transmitters (Hashemian, 2011) , eddy current sensors (García-Martín et al., 2011;
Uchanin and Najda, 2011) and optical fiber sensors (Ferdinand et al., 2013) . Without loss of generality, we assume that the S-A and S-B of the digital I&C system of Fig. 1 are RTDs. We focus on RTDs because they are critical components, whose effectiveness in promptly detecting anomalous temperature changes greatly support plant operators in the monitoring of NPP operational conditions and guide counteracting measure to avoid system failure. This is why RTDs must properly generate accurate and timely data (Baraldi et al., 2015) . The NPP plant power level is, indeed, set based on the information gathered from RTDs: the better the performance of these process instrumentations in terms of measurement accuracy, the larger the power rate with enough margin from the system failure domain F (hence, the better the plant economics) (Yun et al., 2012) .
To build the RTD-MSPM model (as sketched in Fig. 3 ), the sensor failure modes have to be identified (e.g., bias (Uren et al., 2015) , drift (Uren et al., 2015; Garvey and Hines, 2006) , performance degradation (Fernandeza et al., 2015) , freezing (Boskovic and Mehra, 2002) , and calibration error (Castello et al., 2014)  The initial state at time t=0 is sensor functioning state 0
Fig. 3 Schematic diagram of the RTD-MSPM
The RTD-MSPM is further simplified as in 
Estimation of the RTD-MSPM Parameters
RTDs contain a sensing element whose resistance changes with fluid temperature.
Well-type RTDs are assembled into thermowells containing the sensing elements, sheaths and insulation materials, whereas wet-type RTDs are designed for direct immersion into the fluid (Yun et al., 2012) . Two types of RTDs are shown in Fig. 5 (Hashemian, 2011).
Wet-type RTD Well-type RTD Fig. 5 Two types of RTDs (Hashemian, 2011) The performance of RTDs is characterized by their measurement accuracy and response time . The former characterizes the RTD accuracy in measuring a sudden temperature change (Wei et al., 2013) , whereas the latter is a pivotal indicator that measures how quickly the RTD responds to a sudden and significant temperature change (Yun et al., 2012) . On one hand, being the time the RTD needs for reaching 63.2% of a sudden temperature change, is also representative of ; on the other hand, since some failure modes might affect the fluid temperature and some others such as bias, freezing, loss of signal showing constant measured values even if the RTD is degraded and, thus, cannot be considered as performance metric, both and are to be simultaneously considered for defining the RTD failure domain.
Under normal reactor operation conditions, effects of intrinsic properties (intrinsic shape and material properties, for example) are negligible on its own performance because they cannot be altered once the RTD is manufactured, such as and (Hashemian, 1994) . Instead, component aging t and uncertainty of air gap size between the bottom of the thermowell and the RTD sensing tip due to contamination, metallurgical changes, moisture or dirt entering, mechanical shock, etc. are more likely to cause RTD drift (Hashemian, 2011; Swanson, 2007) .
Aging can affect RTD performance with different degradation modes; for example, the sensing element resistance increases under tensile stress and decreases with compression stress that varies with time t, resulting in off-calibration, increase in , reduced insulation resistance, erratic output, wiring problems, etc. Among these, sensor off-calibration and changes are the most relevant features to be monitored (Hashemian, 2011) .
Moreover, we assume to heavily depend on air gap size between the RTD sensing tip and the bottom of the thermowell (Hashemian, 2013) , even though also debris, dirt, and metal shavings entering the thermowell during installation, and/or moisture entering the insulation material during operation can, also cause an off-design of air gap that prevents the RTD from reaching the very bottom of its thermowell.
Moreover, RTD movement in the thermowell due to vibration, thermal, or mechanical shock can cause the RTD sensing tip to displace away from the bottom of the thermowell (Hashemian, 2011) and calibration drift (Yun et al., 2012 ).
In conclusion, in what follows, is identified as the RTD drift physical variable Y being degrading due to t and , as in Eq. (3):
Given a RTD failure threshold not to be exceeded by ( , ) during operation, then, its limit-state function can be formulated as:
To partition the RTD safety domain S from its failure domain F, we firstly build a physical mathematical relationship between , t and based on the experimental data listed in Table 1 and 2 (Hashemian, 2011; Yun et al., 2012) . Fig . 6 shows the trend of as long as t increases, independently from the air gap contamination (i.e., = 0) when data in Table 1 are used as interpolation data. Fig. 7 shows the trend of as a function of , when the RTD is new and data in Table 2 are used as interpolation data (i.e., aging t=0) (Yun et al., 2012) . The function ( , ) as it is plotted in Fig. 8 is obtained by resorting to Eq. (5):
where (0, ) is the curve of Fig. 7 and the factor accounts for the changes of response time with the increase of t, by scaling the ( , 0) using the scale factor αt:
where, 1 = (1) (0) ⁄ . Table 3 reports the estimate of for six discrete aging times t. As mentioned in (Hashemian, 2011) , the τ of a well-type RTD usually ranges in [4s, 8s]; hence, the RTD failure threshold Y is here set equal to 8s. The Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) PS(t, δ) of the RTD new-to-drift-failure mode that can account for the stochasticity of the process and of the uncertainties affecting the degradation (for example, the initial air gap size δ0 and the noise affecting the air gap size δt due to the vibration) can be found by running NM Monte Carlo simulations, as follows (see Table 4 for the list of parameters):
 For each trial, at the initial time t=0, we sample the value of 0 from the uniform distribution U(0,1) as initial air gap size.
 At each t that increases with the time step dt, the value dδt is sampled from a normal distribution N(0,0.025t); thus, δ = δ0 +dδt.
 At each t within the mission time [t0,tm], τ is estimated using the curve τ(t, δ)
of Fig. 8 . If the value of τ exceeds the threshold , the RTD is assumed to fail at time t with air gap size δ. Pictorially, we can show the evolution of ( , ) for each trial, as sketched in Fig.   9 : for a sampled δ0 (equal to 0.12mm), the air gap size oscillates during the RTD life around δ0 (see in Fig. 9(a) ); on the other hand, the response time τ, stochastically changes with the increase of time t (in Fig. 9(b) ) and, thus, the transition between states 0 and 2 (see Fig. 4 ) of drift failure mode is determined when the response time τ reaches the failure threshold , as shown in Fig. 9(c) .
Fig. 9 One trial of MC simulation: (a) the stochastic path of air gap size δ changing with the aging t; (b) the evolution of response time τ with the aging t; (c) the simulated path response time τ with respect to δ and t on the safety domain of the fitting curved surface
After the NM trials of MC simulations have been run, the conditional Probability Density Function (PDF) pS(t|δ) and conditional Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) PS(t|δ) of the RTD New-to-drift transition of Fig. 4 can be empirically built (shown in Fig. 10 and 11 , respectively) and used to calculate the conditional failure rate λS(t|δ): yr, after which it starts to level off to reach PS(t|δ) at 5.8yr. Therefore, the failure rate λS(t|δ) of Fig. 12 shows the typical infant mortality and wear out periods, and tends to be constant in the useful life, which coincides with a general bath-tub curve, but with non-constant values along life.
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Comparison with Markov Chain Model
The results shown in Section 2. The PS(t|δ) (obtained by MSPM) is close to the PS(t) (obtained by MCM), which, however, overestimates the unreliability of the RTD. The degradation process modeling in the MSPM is more realistic than in MCM, and the latter is not able to guarantee the drift onset beyond a threshold value (especially at low aging).
Fig. 14 Failure state probability obtained from MSPM and MCM approaches
The System-Level MSPM for a Digital I&C System
In Section 2 we have shown how it is possible to resort to a MSPM framework to build a realistic model of a component/module that is embedded into a system. Now, the general framework of a MSPM approach is presented, when all the components of a Digital I&C system are considered. As shown in Fig. 15 , we propose a modular scheme that integrates the component-level and/or subsystem-level models into a system-level structure (Gulati and Dugan, 1997; Wang et al., 2015) . Attention should be paid to the definition of system failure modes and to the identification of the component degradation states with their dependencies and the uncertainties, as well as on the inter-component dependencies by a qualitative and quantitative screening of the system behavior (i.e., by Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) (Zio, 2007) ). In this work, the components degradation process, their failure modes and the overall system behavior is modelled by implementing physics model at both component level or/and subsystem level, which consider inter-component and intra-components dependencies and uncertainties. 
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Fig. 16 The system-level MSPM degradation model
The construction of the system-level MSPM for the RPS of Fig. 1 , thus, proceeds as follows:
 Identification of system modules: BPL, LCL and RTB (see section 2).
 Definition of the (N+1) = 5 layers.
The layers of the system-level MSPM of the RPS (see Fig. 17 
Fig. 17 The system-level degradation model of the RPS digital I&C system
The objective of the system-level degradation modeling effort is the quantification of the state probability vector ̅ ( , ̅ ) = { 0 ( , ̅ ), 1 1 ( , ̅ ), ⋯ , ( , ̅ ), ⋯ , 4 ( , ̅ ), 5 ( , ̅ )}, which can be obtained by Monte Carlo simulation to generate random walks across layers and within the MSPM describing each module, as illustrated in section 2. Without loss of generality, we will present a system-level MSPM where only the RTD-MSPM of section 2.1 is considered, whereas all the other components are assumed to obey a binary behavior (safe/failed). Therefore, the RPS system-level MSPM sketched in Fig. 19 , whose states are described in , deterministically lead without any stochasticity to the RPS system failure.
 Time-varying transition rates of the RTD sensors are taken from those of the RTD-MSPM of Section 2.2 (see Fig. 12 ), whereas the transition rates of binary-state components (i.e., BPLs, LCLs and RTB) are taken from public databases (BPL and LCL failure rates and are equal to 1E-6/hr and 5E-6/hr respectively (US: EPRI, 2008), with the common cause factor β=0.1;
whereas RTB failure rate is equal to 4.3E-8/hr (IAEA, 1992)). Either one or the other BPL fails to send out PTSs.
1
Common cause failure of BPL-A and BPL-B.
2
Either one or the other LCL fails to produce the ESS.
Common cause failure of LCL-A and LCL-B.
Both LCLs fail to produce the ESS. Fig. 19 The RPS system-level MSPM integrating RTD New-to-drift failure mode
After NM trials of the Monte Carlo simulation, whose flowchart is shown in Fig.   20 (where the inner shadowed loop corresponds to the Monte Carlo simulation adopted in Section 2.2 for the estimation of the RTD drift onset time), the calculated RPS unreliability ( | ) is plotted in Fig. 21 , and compared with the system unreliability 
Conclusions
A MSPMs framework has been proposed for reliability modeling and assessment of digital I&C systems in NPPs. The designers and operators efforts needed to gather the necessary, and quite detailed, physics of failure data that are to be treated within the MSPM framework makes the method primarily applicable to critical NPPs components.
Indeed, in this work a RTD was considered to develop the component-level MSPM model, being a typical signal input source of digital I&C systems that critically affects its reliability. Monte Carlo simulation has been used for estimating the degradation state probability (i.e. drift-failure state probability) in the RTD-MSPM, by sampling the stochastic evolution of the air gap size, under deterministic aging. The comparison of MCM and MSPM results shows that with realistic assumptions and available knowledge, MSPM provides a better and more complete representation of the component degradation progression.
The modular modeling approach proposed has been applied to develop a systemlevel MSPM model taking for a typical Reactor Protection System (RPS) as benchmark.
The results of the illustrative application demonstrate that the proposed MSPM approach can well explain environmental conditions, aging and degradation of failure events, besides timing and sequencing which can also be solved by traditional dynamic methods (e.g., MCM).
